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appellate division within ten days, his appeal to the Court of
Appeals would not be dismissed.
While the express language of 5601(d) does not limit dual
1 42
appeals, cases interpreting CPA 590 did find such a limitation.'

Since no change of this nature was intended by the recodification,
dual review should not be permitted under the CPLR. Moreover,
the Legislative Studies and Reports indicate that if review of the
subsequent lower court proceedings is desired, the appeal must
first be made to the appellate division and then, after their decision,
to the Court of Appeals. 43 If dual appeals were allowed, they
would be time consuming, result in a duplication of effort, and
offend against the requirement of finality. Therefore, in the
absence of any unusual circumstances, it appears justified to limit
the use of this procedural device.
ARTICLE

CPLR 5701:

57-

APPEALS TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Issue of liability appealable prior to assessment of
damages.

In Fortgang v. Chase Manhattan Bank,' 44 a negligence action,

the issues of liability were tried separately before a jury and a
verdict was found for the plaintiffs. Subsequently, an interlocutory
judgment was entered and the case was set down for an assessment
of damages. On motion to stay trial on the issue of damages
pending an appeal from the interlocutory judgment, the appellate
division, second department, relying on CPLR 5701, granted the
stay, and held the decision appealable. 4
Prior to Fortgang, the second department, in Bliss v. Londner,

46

had held that subsequent to a non-jury trial exclusively on

the issue of liability, the defendant must await the determination
of damnages before an appeal may be instituted.
Two years after the Bliss decision, the appellate division, first
department, in Hacker v. City of New York,'4 7 was confronted

with a similar question. In Hacker, the court held that an appeal
would lie after trial on the issues of liability irrespective of the
fact that the case would be later scheduled for a determination of
142 7

(1964).
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N.Y.2d 797, 221 N.E.2d 914, 275 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1966).
App. Div. 2d 41, 285 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1967).
1-5 CPLR 5701 provides in part that: "An appeal may be taken to the
appellate division as of right in an action, originating in the supreme court
or county court:
1. from any final or interlocutory judgment ..
146 20 App. Div. 2d 640, 246 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2d Dep't 1964).
14725 App. Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1966).
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damages. The court distinguished cases not allowing appeals in
single trials, i.e., where "the issue of liability is first determined
by triers who promptly go on to hear the issue of damages," 148
emphasizing that the decision was limited to split trials.
Thus, in the interests of uniformity in appellate practice and
in the administration of justice, the appellate division, second department, reinforces the position taken by the first department. In
the second department, an appeal will now lie as of right regardless
of whether the determination was made by a court or a jury or
whether the appeal is made from an interlocutory judgment or an
order.
ARTICLE

62

-

ATTACHMENT

CPLR 6214(d): Special proceeding nay be commenced against
defendant as well as garnishee to compel pay nent to sheriff.
CPLR 6214(d) provides that where an order of attachment
has been levied upon property or debts a special proceeding may
be commenced against the garnishee by the plaintiff to compel the
payment of the debt to the sheriff.
In Homn-De-Lite Realty Corp. v. Trivmboli, 49 plaintiff initiated
a proceeding to compel the defendant, as distinguished from the
garnishee, to pay a sum of money to the sheriff, upon which money
a levy had been previously made by an order of attachment. The
court held that, although CPLR 6214(d) does not expressly provide
that the plaintiff has such a remedy against the defendant in the
action, other related statutory provisions clearly imply that the
remedy is available against the defendant.150
It appears that this construction of the statute is in accordance
with the legislature's intent in enacting CPLR 6214(d).151 Since
related sections such as CPLR 6202 provide that where the term
"judgment debtor" is referred to in certain sections of the CPLR,
it should be construed to mean "defendant." It is a reasonable
inference that "garnishee" should also be construed to mean "defendant." This is especially true when the literal construction of
52
the terms results in unnecessary hardship.'
24S Id. at 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
14028 App. Div. 2d 1127, 284 N.Y.S.2d 141 (2d Dep't 1967).
15o Sece CPLR 5225, 6202.
1, See McKiNNEYs STATUTES, Bk. 1, § 111 at 180, in which it is stated
that remedial statutes should receive a liberal construction: "[I]t is particularly proper to extend their operation to cases within the intent of the
lawmakers though not covered by the exact meaning of their language."
252 Id.

